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This thesis starts by describing credit default swaps (CDS), their benefits, costs, and how the 
market for these credit derivatives has been evolving in the past years. The main question that 
this thesis aims to answer is what are the factors that influence the prices of these financial 
products. The period under analysis goes from January 2006 to December 2016, and a sample 
of 72 European non-financial companies has been used. Through an econometric study using 
panel data regressions, the three theoretical determinants – leverage, risk-free rate and volatility 
- proposed by Merton’s model are firstly tested. All variables are found to be statistically 
significant but the low explanatory power of this regression (14.88%) suggests there are other 
factors influencing CDS prices. By considering additional variables accounting for firm, market 
and liquidity factors, the explanatory power of all determinants more than doubled (34.33%). 
In addition, there is a multi-period analysis where all the determinants are analysed in different 
periods of the whole sample to check for changes in their significance. The main conclusion is 
that the theoretical determinants have rather limited power when explaining CDS prices and 
therefore other variables should be, though carefully, considered. In addition, not all variables 
have always had the same significance when explain CDS price changes. This thesis ends with 
a consideration of its limitations, and some suggestions to overcome these issues.  
I would like to sincerely thank both my thesis supervisors, professor João Pereira from Nova 
School of Business and Economics and professor Luc Henrard from the Louvain School of 
Management for their help, advices and availability throughout this project. 
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Derivatives are financial instruments designed to reduce the uncertainty coming from a variety 
of sources such as exchange or interest rates, commodity or equity prices, and also credit. Given 
the wide range of derivatives there is and the variety of benefits and uses these bring, companies 
can minimize uncertainty across almost all their activities with the help of derivatives and hence 
generate future growth.  
A vital part for the world’s economic growth is financial activity. And a vital part for a 
successful financial activity are proper risk management practices. As such, risk management 
comprises the identification and development of procedures to minimize the impacts of the risks 
that affect the businesses of both banks and companies. Within the risks that are present among 
businesses is credit risk – the risk that a debtholder might not meet its contractual obligations 
when a credit event occurs, resulting in a loss for the borrower. To minimize this risk, credit 
derivatives, with the special focus on credit default swaps (CDS), have been created, as these 
provide an insurance against the risk of a credit event. Simply put, a CDS contract comprises 
two parties, where one buys the insurance by paying periodic instalments (CDS spreads) to the 
insurance provider who in case of a credit event pays the protection, and a third party, which is 
the party the contract is written on. But what influences the prices of those periodic instalments? 
It all started in 1974 when Robert Merton developed the first model to price credit risk, where 
the firm’s asset value is related to credit risk and where three determinants appeared to answer 
the previous question – firm’s leverage, risk-free rate, and assets’ volatility1. Throughout the 
years, however, other models have been developed in order to better answer more properly to 
what moves those prices. 
																																																						
1 Under Merton’s model, the assets’ volatility is not historical - it is the true volatility that characterizes the assets 
distribution going forward. Nonetheless, while in empirical work historical volatility may be used as its proxy (as 




In addition to the models developed the years, previous empirical studies have tried to 
understand the different measures of credit risk. Two of the most important studies in the field 
are Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein & Martin (2001) (CGM) and Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo 
(2004) (EJO), and will serve as references for many of the upcoming sections of this thesis. 
CGM tried to investigate the issue by using bonds credit spreads, while EJO used CDS spreads 
for their analysis. According to other authors, the use of CDS spreads is however is preferable 
since these are quotes from actual dealers, while bond prices do not necessarily reflect the prices 
at which the trades happen (Hull, Predescu, & White, 2004) and, besides mirroring credit risk, 
CDS spreads also reflect bonds’ illiquidity (Longstaff, Mithal, & Neis, 2005). As the market 
for CDS appears to be more liquid than the bond market, CDS spreads seem to be better 
indicators of credit risk. To complement, not only the CDS market responds faster to changes 
in firms’ credit risk than the bond market, but also the use of bond spreads implies the choice 
of the most appropriate risk-free benchmark rate, which is a rather difficult task. Having pointed 
out all the reasons above, this thesis makes use of CDS spreads in the study of their 
determinants. 
This master thesis aims to be a valuable tool for anyone who is interested in knowing more 
about CDS, by answering to questions such what are these products, what are their benefits and 
concerns, how the market for these credit derivatives has been developing, and ultimately what 
influences the prices of credit default swaps. In the econometric section of this study, there is a 
first part which intends to find how well the theoretical determinants derived by Merton are 
able to explain the prices of CDS, followed by other regressions with additional possible 
determinants that will be further explained. As a final analysis, this study examines different 
periods of the entire sample, in order to test the effect of different economic events in the 
determination of CDS prices. All the results and findings are later on presented, followed by 





When any investment is made, there are different types of risk associated that can be 
categorized into different risk sources. For instance, when an investor buys bonds of Unilever 
in Euros, there are several risks associated: interest rate risk, i.e. the risk that the European 
Central Bank might follow a contractionary monetary policy; currency risk, i.e. the risks that 
the Euro might devalue relative to the US dollar; credit risk, i.e. the risk that Unilever might 
not be able to achieve its financial liabilities on time and consequently enter in default. 
Relatively to the last risk previously mentioned, there is a wide range of credit derivatives, 
whose main goal is to mitigate credit risk by isolating it from the contract and transferring it to 
a third party who is willing to assume this risk for a pre-defined fee. Essentially, the main idea 
behind credit derivatives the relocation of credit risk from one party to another. 
Although there is a vast range of instruments used to transfer credit risk, their classification is 
rather simple, and it is done according to each instrument specific characteristics – credit risk 
may be transferred through either single (single name) or multiple borrowers (multi name), and 
the underlying asset in each transaction may be sold (funded) or not (unfunded). 
Credit default swaps (CDS) are a type of unfunded risk instruments, are widely used by 
investors all over the world, and are the most popular instruments for trading credit risk. A 
credit default swap is no more than a bilateral over-the-counter agreement between two entities 
used to transfer the credit risk of a given underlying from one entity to another. 
A “plain vanilla” CDS is a contract between two parties in which the protection buyer of the 
CDS pays fixed periodic premiums to the protection seller until the maturity of the CDS, or 
until a specific credit event happens. In the case of a credit event, the deal is settled since the 
protection buyer receives either a physical or cash payment from the protection seller, according 
to the specifications of the agreement. If there is no credit event during the time of the 




flows of payments are the fixed leg (fixed premiums paid by the buyer) and the contingent leg 
(payment by the seller contingent on the credit event). 
Instead of viewing a CDS contract as a transaction of protection, it can also be seen as a 
transaction of credit risk. When looking at it this way, the protection buyer is the seller of the 
credit risk, as he could simply sell the underlying asset which would immediately reduce his 
exposure to credit risk and, similarly, the protection seller is the credit risk buyer, as he could 
gain exposure to credit risk by buying the underlying asset. In fact, the CDS is, many times, a 
cheaper alternative to gain or reduce the exposure to the underlying’s credit risk relatively to 
buying or selling the asset, respectively. This is one of the reasons that make CDS so popular 
among investors – a cheaper alternative to increase or decrease exposure to credit risk. 
Regarding the payment structure of CDS, the fixed leg paid by the protection buyer is derived 
as a percentage of the notional amount of the underlying asset, and the common periodicity for 
the payments is quarterly. The total amount of premiums paid per year by the protection buyer 
corresponds to the CDS spread and it is quoted in basis points. In addition to the payment 
structure, it is important to understand what are the credit events (the scenarios in which the 
protection payment is made) that trigger the payment from the protection seller to the buyer. 
The three most common credit events are: Bankruptcy – when the underlying firm becomes 
insolvent and cannot repay its debt; Failure to Pay – when the underlying, after a grace period, 
fails to pay either the principal or interest on its liabilities pay (values must be subjected to a 
materiality threshold); Restructuring – when there is an alteration to the terms of debt 
obligations that is unfavorable to creditors such as lower coupons or lengthier maturity.2 
After the credit event is triggered and confirmed by a central decision-making entity3, the 
settlement of the CDS is made via cash or physically. When CDS are cash settled, the protection 
																																																						
2More about this in Bomfim, 2005 
3The Determination Committee was created in 2009 to deal with different issues regarding the settlement 




buyer receives the difference between the face and market value of the reference obligation 
from the protection seller, where the market price is usually defined by an auction of dealers 
who define the final market price. In this case, the reference obligation refers to the underlying’s 
debt predefined in the CDS contract, and normally corresponds to senior unsecured bonds. On 
the other hand, when CDS are settled physically, the protection buyer has the right to sell a 
variety of deliverable obligations to the protection seller, who in turn must pay their full face 
value. These deliverable obligations correspond to any obligation that has the same rank in the 
underlying’s capital structure as the reference obligation (Bomfim, 2005). Cash settlements are 
the method most commonly used to settle CDS contracts (Chaplin, 2010). 
Besides plain vanilla CDS, other types of CDS such as digital CDS, loan-only credit default 
swaps (LCDS), and CDS indexes also exist in the market. Digital CDS are contracts where the 
payment made in the case of a credit event is a fixed amount and therefore does not depend on 
the market value of the obligations at default. LCDS have the same structure of simple CDS, 
except that the underlying entity is restricted to syndicated secured loans, rather than any bond 
or loan4. CDS indexes are portfolios of single-name CDS that allow investors to transfer credit 
risk of a wide range of credits in a much more efficient way than by dealing with single-name 
contracts. In fact, CDS indexes are the most liquid financial instruments in the credit market 
nowadays. 
1.1	-	The	Good	
Credit default swaps have gained a major popularity in financial markets in the past years thanks 
to the various benefits that will now be discussed. 
Given their structure, credit default swaps allow for risk diversification of the market 
participants. For example, these products can help financial institutions to hedge part of their 
																																																						
4In Europe, LCDS are used as a hedging product, whereas in the US their use and trade is seen as an investment 
strategy. European banks, which are the main originators of syndicated secured loans, use these contracts as 




credit exposure with the acquisition of protection in case of credit events. In practice, bank A 
may be asked by company X to grant it a loan in addition to those that the company already has 
under bank A’s balance sheet. If the bank does not want to incur in the loan because it sees it 
as a risky operation that would only increase the risk exposure to company X, the bank can 
incur in a CDS contract on company X with a third party to offload part of the credit exposure 
instead of rejecting the operation right away. This way the bank is able to not only finance the 
company’s operation and increase its profits, but also to manage its exposure and diversify the 
risk. CDS contracts are therefore tools that minimize credit risk from operations. From another 
perspective, bank A may also be interested in gaining exposure to different industries without 
the need to supply credit. Instead, the bank can sell protection for these companies in the CDS 
market and consequently gain exposure to the chosen industries. All in all, credit default swaps 
are useful tools for risk management purposes, as banks can use them according to their 
preferences. The same reasoning can be applied to individual or institutional investors. If, for 
instance, investor B has a long position on company’s Y bonds, he may enter in a CDS contract 
to prevent his losses in the event that company Y enters in default. 
Besides the benefits of diversification, credit default swaps are highly valuable tools when 
assessing one company’s credit risk. Although credit ratings do exist for the same purpose, they 
are generally a reactive instead of a proactive response to alarming signals, many times are 
inconsistent and do not provide much insightful information, as history tells (in the beginning 
period of the 07/08 financial crisis, many entities had their ratings overestimated despite many 
suspicious indicators). In addition, there are evidences that the market for CDS absorbs new 
information about credit risk faster than rating announcements (Hull, Predescu, & White, 2004) 
and (Norden & Weber, 2009). As such, the CDS market is generally seen as a more insightful 




incorporated. This characteristic therefore increases the transparency in the market and allows 
participants to make better informed judgements on companies’ credit risk. 
In addition to these benefits, the creation of the Determination Committee to help with the 
issues regarding the proper definition of credit events, how the settlement procedures should be 
done and what type of obligations are valid when settling a contract has helped the CDS market 
to gain reliability and acceptance amongst market participants. 
1.2	-	The	Bad	
Despite the numerous benefits that CDS have for market participants, there are also some risks 
regarding the use of these financial products that need to be considered. The financial crisis of 
07/08 has highlighted some of the drawbacks of credit default swaps, and in fact, many have 
pointed out these as one of the main reasons for the burst of the world financial markets and 
economy. 
Within the CDS market, two risks became evident during the financial crisis: counterparty risk, 
concentration risk, and the relationship between the two. Counterparty risk – the risk that at 
least one of the counterparties does not meet the contractual obligations of the agreement – is a 
transversal risk to all over-the-counter derivative markets (markets in which the transactions 
are private contracts negotiated between two entities without recurring to intermediaries such 
exchanges) that as been intensified by concentration risk – risk there is a high concentration of 
sellers and dealers in a market. According to different surveys, the top ten counterparts of each 
large bank in Europe accounted for about two third of the banks’ credit exposure in 2009 
(European Central Bank, 2009), while in the US more than 90% of the credit derivative 
exposure of one hundred companies during the first quarter of the same year was concentrated 





The problems of having such a degree of counterparty and concentration risks have three main 
strands. Firstly, if one dealer enters in default, specially if it is large, the systemic risk increases, 
since the probabilities that others follow the same path in a chain effect increases. In addition, 
if there is a credit event one an entity that has been largely underwritten, large payments are 
activated, which also increases the correlation of default of the highly related dealers in the 
market. Last but not least, since the OTC markets are rather opaque when compared with 
exchanges, a default of either a dealer or a reference entity creates generates a high level of 
uncertainty among all participants which can lead to a steep decrease in the market liquidity. 
In addition to the aforementioned risks, moral hazard, asymmetrical information as well as 
insider trading emerge as possible drawbacks within the CDS world. When considering the 
banking sector, since it becomes very costly to monitor loans to borrowers and because on top 
of that capital charges are high when holding risky loans, banks tend to find ways to avoid at 
maximum the associated costs. Within these ways are CDS contracts, which although being 
tools to reduce credit exposition, these are also a way that banks have to detach themselves 
from the borrowers with them to notice, which causes problems of asymmetrical information. 
In addition, this situation can cause the monitoring process of loans much sloppier and thus 
increase banks’ control over the terms of the lending relationships, as there are no incentives to 
control borrowers properly given the protection from transferring credit risk. This situation can 
lead to moral hazard.  
These information asymmetries can also cause the issue of insider trading, as banks possess 
inside and private information on the reference companies that can be used in their favour in 
the CDS market. As an example, a bank could try to exploit the private information it has on 
the likelihood of default of one of its clients by protection on the same client from a poorer 
informed counterparty. Given that the main bank dealers in the CDS market have strong 




Another major concern around the market CDS has been speculation and price manipulation. 
There are have been several critics that, during the financial crisis of 07/08, some market 
speculators have bought large amounts CDS contracts which consequently drove down the 
bond and stock prices of the underlying entities. By signalling problems regarding companies’ 
solvency, speculators were able to take advantage of the uncertainty surrounding financial 
markets. 
1.3	-	The	Market5	
In 1997 JP Morgan created the first CDS contract ever. This event marked the beginning of the 
market for credit derivatives and ever since then the financial markets’ landscape has never 
been the same. Since the beginning of the new millennium and until the burst of the financial 
in 2007, CDS contracts experienced remarkable growth rates. Nevertheless, the results 
published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show that in in the first half of 2008, 
and for the first time since 2004 (date of the first results publication), the CDS volumes declined 
relatively to the numbers of the end of 2007. This variation was mainly driven by the credit 
market crunch caused by the financial crisis that lead to a portfolio compression by banks (a 
reduction of the portfolios notional amount and contracts outstanding in which the risk profile 
and cash flows remain the same) and to a decrease in the number of the market participants. 
Despite the decline in the outstanding volumes of credit default swaps, their gross market value 
actually increased by 58% during the same period.  
Given these seemingly contradictory variations, it is necessary to distinguish the difference 
between the concepts of notional outstanding and gross market value. While the notional 
outstanding is a reference point for the computation of contractual payments which is 
established at the beginning of contracts when their market value is zero, the market value 
varies along time since it is a reflection of the market expectations about the contract. When 
																																																						




contracts are established, if market values of CDS rise (drop) it is because default is more (less) 
likely to happen or because recovery rates are expected to be (lower) higher in the case of a 
credit event. All in all, gross market values are better indicators of the value of CDS contracts 
as they reflect better the underlying risks. As such, it makes sense the above values for the 
increase in CDS contracts gross market value, as the default risk highly increased with the start 
of the financial crisis in 2007. 
During the following semesters, the notional amounts of CDS contracts experienced a sharp 
decline, and naturally the gross market values adjusted and started to decrease as well – by the 
end of 2009 the gross market value of CDS contracts had decreased 35% relatively to the 
beginning of the year. During the first half 2011, however, the notional amounts of CDS 
contracts actually increased 8% despite no significant changes were registered at their gross 
market values. By the end of the year though, the notional amounts had decreased once again, 
while the gross market values for CDS contracts increased which could have been caused by 
the strengthening of the USD in relation to other currencies due to the Eurozone crisis (CDS 
data is expressed in US dollars). For the upcoming years, a downward trend characterized the 
evolution of both the notional amounts and gross market values for CDS contracts (see graphs 
below), to a situation where as of December 2016, the notional amounts outstanding amount to 
$9.9 trillion, and the gross market values of CDS contracts amount to $292 billion. These values 
are specially striking when compared to their maximums – $58.2 trillion and $5.1 trillion 
respectively - which shows that the CDS market has been losing popularity, in result of not only 
the financial crisis, but also as consequence of the multiple cases of misuse with these credit 







There are two main approaches when modelling credit risk: structural models and reduced form 
models. This section will first comprise a broad analysis of structural models with special 
attention paid to Merton’s model, followed by brief overview of reduced-form models, and 
finally a wrap up about the two approaches. 
2.1	-	Structural	Models	
In structural models, the dynamics of a firm’s asset value are explicitly modelled and there is a 
clear connection between credit risk and a firm’s fundamental variables. Under this approach, 
the firm is assumed to default if the total assets’ value falls under a certain default threshold, 
and the main parameters affecting one’s default probability are financial leverage, assets 





















Merton (1974) with his seminal model – a framework where: (1) the firm’s assets value is 
related to its credit risk; (2) the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model is used to price 
defaultable bonds and the equity of the firm – has majorly contributed for this field, where 
many extensions have been developed throughout the years to overcome the shortcomings of 
the early models. Nonetheless, Merton’s work still remains has a reference for today’s credit 
risk management models such as CreditMetrics or Moody’s KMV model. 
There are four main types of structural models (Jakovlev, 2007): firm value models, first-
passage models, liquidation process models and state dependent models. The rationale behind 
the existence of distinct types of models suggests a need to overcome the main drawbacks that 
each type of model presents.  
Firm value models (e.g., Merton) consider that a firm’s default can only occur at the maturity 
of its debt and therefore disregard the firm value before maturity. To overcome this situation, 
practitioners have developed first-passage models, that consider default scenarios when the 
firm’s assets value drops for the first time below a certain “default barrier”, which can happen 
anytime before or at maturity. This barrier (Beem, 2010) can be either defined as exogenous –
outside the model - or endogenous – within the model. Given that these models allow for 
defaults to happen at any time until maturity, the probability of positive payoffs for the 
shareholders is, in this case, lower than the one implied by firm value models. Hence, both the 
probability of default and credit spreads implied by first-passage models are higher than, for 
instance, the ones implied by Merton’s model, as it makes sense that investors should pay more 
to protect themselves against any eventual decrease in the firm’s value below the default barrier. 
One remarkable example of this type of models has been developed by Black and Cox (1976). 
Regarding liquidation process models and state dependent models, both have emerged as 
extensions with the purpose of incorporating different real-world occurrences into the existent 




threshold, it does not necessarily mean the firm’s immediate liquidation contrarily to what other 
models assume. Instead, it means that the default will trigger an often long process which might, 
or not, lead in fact to the firm’s liquidation. In the case of state dependent models, these extend 
structural models by incorporating some parameters that can be contingent upon the state, such 
as business cycles or the firm’s external rating, and others such as bankruptcy costs, cash flows 
and financing costs (Elizalde, 2006). With these two types of models, and given the 
consideration of different phenomena when compared to standard structural models, the 
problems regarding the predictability of bankruptcies can be reduced. By including other 
parameters that influence the firm’s ability to generate cash flows or its funding costs - main 
drivers of default probabilities -, some of the drawbacks of standards models can be 
counterbalanced (Gruiescu, Ungureanu, & Ioanas, 2012). 
In order to better understand the dynamics of structural models, and as a basis for the upcoming 
sections (the econometrical part of this paper will be evaluated from the perspective of 
structural form models), the model developed by Merton (1974) along with its main 
implications and drawbacks will be discussed more in depth. 
2.2	-	Merton’s	Model	
The framework developed by Robert C. Merton (1974) has set the ground rules for the vast 
range of structural models that currently exist in credit risk. Simply put, the underlying idea 
behind this framework is that credit events can be explicitly related to the firm’s assets value 
by making use of the Black & Scholes options pricing model to price corporate liabilities, where 
the final output is the firm’s credit spread. This is a rather straightforward process, but only if 
some assumptions and conditions are fulfilled a priori. In order to understand the mechanics of 
Merton’s model, the fundamental assumptions as well as the default conditions that need to be 




Within the model there are no transaction nor bankruptcy costs, no taxes, and hence the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem holds. Besides, assets’ trading is continuous, there are no 
restrictions regarding the short-selling of assets, and the risk-free interest rate r is known and 
constant at any point in time. Regarding the assets’ value 𝑉#, firms are assumed to have simple 
capital structures comprised by equity 𝐸#, and debt as a single zero-coupon bond with maturity 
T , face value F, and current market value	𝐵#. Thus, the firm’s market value can be described 
as 𝑉# = 𝐸# + 𝐵#. In addition, and to allow for the computation of the default probabilities over 
time, the dynamics of the assets’ value 𝑉# under Merton’s model take the form of a geometric 
Brownian motion 
 𝑑𝑉# = 𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊# (1) 
where 𝑊# is a standard Brownian motion that follows a normal distribution 𝑊#	~	𝑁(0, 𝑡) with 
independent increments, and 𝜇 and 𝜎 correspond respectively to the mean and standard 
deviation of the assets’ returns. 
As Merton Model assumes that default can only happen at maturity T, and given that default 
happens when the value of assets at maturity falls below the face value of debt, there are two 
possible scenarios at 𝑡 = 𝑇 - survival or default. If the firm survives, 𝑉# > 𝐹 which means the 
firm is able to pay back its debt, and that the firm’s shareholders will have a payoff equal to 
𝑉# − 𝐹. In the event of default, 𝑉# < 𝐹 and consequently the firm enters in default by not being 
able to pay back its debt face value to bondholders. Under the latter scenario, bondholders get 
the amount 𝑉# while taking control of the firm, making the payoff for shareholders equal to 
zero. To sum up, the aforementioned payoffs at maturity can be written as: 
 𝐸# = max(𝑉# − 𝐹; 0) (2) 
 





 Survival	(𝑉# > 𝐹)	 Default	(𝑉# < 𝐹) 
𝐸# 𝑉# − 𝐹 0	
𝐵# 𝐹 𝑉# 
 
The central idea around Merton’s model lies precisely in the way these payoffs are interpreted. 
Under the conditions imposed by the model, the equity’s payoff has the same behavior of a call 
option on the firm’s assets with maturity 𝑇 and strike price equal to 𝐹. Thus, using the Black & 
Scholes call option formula, it is possible to compute how much the firm’s equity is worth6: 
 𝐶N = 𝑉N𝑁 𝑑O − 𝐹𝑒QRS𝑁 𝑑T  (4) 
The firm’s debt payoff, which is essentially a bond with default risk associated, has the same 
behavior of a portfolio comprised by two securities: a risk-free bond 𝐹 with maturity 𝑇, and a 
short position of a put option 𝑃N on the firm’s assets with maturity 𝑇 and strike price equal to 
𝐹. In fact, this portfolio’s present value (value of the defaultable bond) is nothing more than the 
present value of the risk-free bond discounted at the risk-free interest rate plus the present value 
of the short put position, which can be computed through the Black & Scholes put options 
pricing formula, i.e., 
 𝐵N = 𝐹𝑒QRS − 𝑃N (5) 
by using the Black & Scholes formula, 
 𝑃N = 𝐹𝑒QRS𝑁 −𝑑T − 𝑉N𝑁 −𝑑O  (6) 
where, 
 𝑑O =
ln 𝑉N 𝐹 + 𝑖 + 𝜎T 2 𝑇
𝜎 𝑇
=






ln 𝑉N 𝐹 + 𝑖 − 𝜎T 2 𝑇
𝜎 𝑇
= 𝑑O − 𝜎 𝑇 (8) 
																																																						




with 𝑁 .  representing the standard normal cumulative density function and 𝑉N the initial 
assets’ value. Note that in 𝑑O there is a ratio between the present value of the risk-free debt and 
𝑉N, which in fact corresponds to the inverse of the firm’s leverage ratio (𝐿 ≡ 𝐹𝑒QRS 𝑉N). 
As the debt of the firm can be seen as a risky bond and priced as such, it is also possible to 
calculate its yield to maturity: 







And as the yield to maturity of this risky bond corresponds to the risk-free interest rate plus the 
default risk, the default spread 𝑠 is simply the difference between the yield to maturity and the 
riskless rate. 
 𝑦𝑡𝑚 = 𝑖 + 𝑠 ⇔ 	𝑠 = 𝑦𝑡𝑚 − 𝑖 (10) 
To calculate the default spread, the final step is to substitute the 𝑦𝑡𝑚 term by (9), 𝐵N for (5) and 
𝑃N for (6). Instead of these arithmetical gymnastics, the credit spread - Merton’s model main 
output - can be directly computed through: 
 


























All in all, this is the essence of Merton’s model, the first structural model designed for modeling 
credit risk. Within the model, and as the above formulas imply, there are only three theoretical 
determinants that become necessary to price credit risk: leverage, risk-free rate, and historical 
volatility. Although the simplicity that characterizes this model allows for a simple and rather 
quick application of credit risk to firms, there are some limitations around the process that have 





In Merton’s model firm’s debt is modeled as a simple zero coupon bond structure, and this 
naturally does not correspond to what happens in reality. As so, other models (Geske, 1977) 
that consider more complicated debt structures such as debt coupons, debt subordination, 
payout restrictions, sinking funds or safety covenants have been developed to deal with this 
situation. 
In addition, Merton considers that default can only happen at the maturity of the debt, while in 
practice companies can default at any time due to any financial obligation. To deal with this 
problem, the already mentioned FPM (first-passage models) have been developed. 
Another naive inference in Merton’s model is that interest-rates have constant and flat 
behaviors. In fact, several authors in the literature have considered and incorporated stochastic 
interest rates along with taxes to increase the model’s quality. This has been the case of, among 
others, Jones et al. (1984), Ronn and Verma (1986), Nielsen et al. (1993) or Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995). Besides these limitations, Merton also assumes that the firm’s value is 
tradable. Here, an unrealistic situation arises in the sense that the firm’s value as well as its 
underlying parameters cannot be directly observed. Nonetheless, assigning the right dynamics 
to the value of the firm is not an exclusive challenge of Merton’s model, but of all structural 
models, as the procedures differ from one model to another. Even if the value is extracted 
directly from balance sheet data, the methods to reach the firm value are often highly sensitive 
to the assumptions and methods used. 
2.4	-	Reduced-Form	Models	
Contrarily to structural models where default is endogenously derived from specific model 
conditions, reduced-form models treat default in an exogenous manner where the parameters 
are extracted from past bond prices data. Although this means that no economic explanation is 




stochastic process greatly simplifies the whole process in reduced-form models. All in all, the 
main idea behind this type of models is that credit events occur unexpectedly. There are two 
main modelling processes that give rise to reduced-form models, one related to the evolution 
of risk-free interest rates and another for the likelihood of default. Nonetheless, there is another 
exogenous process that in principle could be specified, which is related to the determination of 
recovery rates, although in practice constant recovery rates are commonly used in these models. 
Usually, under this approach, the default likelihood is modelled through an intensity process 
(that can take one of various forms – constant intensity, time-varying intensity, stochastic 
intensity) in which the intensity represents the likelihood of default over any given time horizon, 
and the higher the intensity, the higher the likelihood of default. Within reduced form-models 
there are various of relevance, such as the Litterman-Iben Model (1991), and the Jarrow and 
Turnbull model (1995). 
Nonetheless, as the focus of this paper consists of a study based on the determinants according 
to credit risk structural models and more specifically Merton’s model, I will not take a deep 
approach with respect to reduced-form models. 
2.5	-	Structural	Models	and	Reduced-Form	Models:	Wrap	up		
So far, both structural models as well as reduced-form models have been discussed. Although 
the mechanics as well as the assumptions of each model obviously differ from one model to 
another, if there is one major difference between the two types that should be mentioned, it 
would have to be about the amount of information that is available under each scenario. 
Structural models assume that the information available is equivalent to the one held by the 
firm’s manager, in the sense there is total knowledge about all the firm’s assets and liabilities, 
which implies that the default time is predictable. Contrarily to this view, reduced-form models 
assume that the information that exists is the one that is exclusively perceived by the market. 




default, and hence default is characterized by uncertainty. Indeed, reduced form-models need 
less knowledge on the firm’s capital structure than structural models to draw any conclusions, 
but that should not be enough to prefer one type over another. 
As pointed out in the literature, the question should not be which model is the best in terms of 
performance, but whether or not the models should base the assumptions on the information set 
present in the market or not (Jarrow & Protter, 2004). Nonetheless, many authors agree that the 
asset value process is not observable by the market (Duan, 1994) (Ericsson & Reneby, 2002) 
(Ericsson & Reneby, 2003), and therefore there is a general consensus around the adoption of 
reduced form models in favour of structural models to price and hedge credit risk. Of course 
this choice depends on the purpose for which the model is to be used. If one desires it for pricing 
a firm’s risky debt or its related credit derivatives, reduced-form models should be preferred. 
However, if one represents the management within a firm, and if there is enough information 
available, then structural models may be preferred to assess the firm’s default risk for capital 
considerations for instance. 
In terms of performance, there are several case studies that test the validity and strength of both 
approaches. For instance, the study from Arora et al. (2006) tests the performance of two 
structural models (Merton’s model and Vasicek-Kealhofer – an extension of Merton that 
considers more classes of liabilities, cash payouts, and where default can happen at any time – 
for more info please refer to KMV EDF model) against one reduced-form model (Hull-White 
model) and conclude that Merton’s model significantly underestimates spreads while VK and 
HW models overestimate the same spreads. Overall, VK, the structural model, performs better 
than the reduced-form model HW and the simple Merton model (Arora, Bohn, & Zhu, 2006). 
This, however, does not necessarily mean that structural models should always be used, as it 




Still regarding the performance of the models, the results concerning Merton from the previous 
case study are consistent the existing literature on the subject. Jones et a. (1984), and Huang & 
Zhou (2008) have also reached the same conclusion in their studies that the model prices are 
much smaller that the equivalent market prices of CDS spreads, specially for shorter maturities. 
This disparity could be related with the already discussed limitations around Merton’s model. 
However, the underlying reason for the poor performance in computing credit spreads is yet to 
be clarified. As in Merton’s model the firm’s asset value is modelled as a Geometric Brownian 
Motion, and that default can only happen at maturity, default predictability increases as the 
maturity of the debt comes closer. As so, a scenario of default is not a surprise anymore, and 
therefore short term credit spreads are very close to zero. Jeroen van Beem (2010) illustrates 
this problem with a series of graphs that show how both the probability of default and the CDS 
spreads are zero for short maturities. 
Nevertheless, Merton’s model is not the only one that suffers from the underestimation of 
market credit spreads. Overall, market CDS spreads are much higher than the ones computed 
from credit risk models, since there seems to be an overcompensation for the existing levels of 
risk – commonly known as the credit spread puzzle. In conclusion, there are more factors 
affecting market spreads than just credit risk. 
The next sections of this thesis, namely the econometric study, will focus on the analysis of 
some of the factors that should be considered when computing CDS spreads. Whether these 
factors make economic or rational sense, the reasoning for their inclusion as well the impact on 
the market CDS spreads will be clarified, in an attempt to find out more about what moves the 
prices of these financial products. 
3	-	Data	and	Methodology	
The following section is the basis for the econometric study of this paper. Nevertheless, and 




to explain which variables have been used in this report. The CDS determinants that have been 
chosen for the regressions can be divided in three main groups: theoretical determinants, firm 
based determinants, and market based determinants. In addition, a variable to account for the 
liquidity of CDS contracts has also been added, along with a lagged CDS variable. Besides the 
explanations for each variable, and how each one affects CDS spreads according to the existent 
literature, the methods for data collection will also be clarified. 
3.1	-	Data	
Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants of CDS in European 
companies, and to define a representative sample of the European paradigm, the data that has 
been collected refers to the STOXX Europe 600 Index constituents, which represents large, mid 
and small capitalization companies across 17 European countries. However, several steps were 
required in order to reach the final sample of companies. From the 600 components of the index, 
American companies that are represented in this index have removed, as well and the ones 
operating in financials sectors, in order to have a comparable basis of firms in terms of balance 
sheet information. Moreover, the sample period for the analysis consists of monthly 
observations during 01/01/2006 to 31/12/2016. All data was collected from Bloomberg. 
3.2	-	Dependent	Variable	
The CDS sample used in this paper consists of monthly quotes on 5-year CDS contracts (𝑐𝑑𝑠) 
of the aforementioned firms. This maturity was chosen since these are the most liquid contracts 
available in the market (Carol & Kaeck, 2007) (Ericsson, Jacobs, & Oviedo, 2004). However, 
not all companies had 5-year CDS contracts ticker available, and of those who had, not all 
information was available. As so, and in order to only work with companies where full 
information was available and that did not default over the entire sample period, the final 





In order to be line with the studies of EJO and CGM, the theoretical determinants used in this 
paper will be the same as the ones assumed in Merton’s model. As so, leverage, the risk-free 
rate and historical volatility will now be discussed. 
3.3.1	-	Leverage	
Under Merton’s model, firm’s leverage is a crucial determinant of credit spreads. According to 
the model, if the assets value is less than the debt’s face value at maturity, the firm enters in 
default. As such, the higher the leverage the higher the default risk. Intuitively, all things else 
equal, a firm that incurs in more leverage should see the price of its insurance against default 
increase (higher CDS spread), which suggests a positive relationship between the two variables. 
In fact, this positive relationship is confirmed in several studies, such as EJO and CGM. 
To collect data from companies, monthly leverage ratios have been calculated according to 
CGM’s formula, using the book value of total liabilities and market value of equity from 






The risk-free rate is also considered under Merton a key determinant for firms’ credit spread, 
and despite the erroneous assumption of a constant rate throughout the time period, some 
conclusions can still be drawn of how it affects the spread. An increase in the risk-free rate, 
ceteris paribus, should decrease the credit spread. The reasoning is that higher risk-free rates 
increase the risk-neutral drift of the firm’s value, and consequently the probability of default 
decreases (Blanco, Brennan, & March, 2005). Evidences from this relationship can be found in 




As CGM and EJO use a 10-year government rate as proxy for the risk-free rate, a 10-year rate 
was also used in this case to be in line with the literature. More specifically, the yield used was 
the 10-year German government bond (𝑟ONQ[z{|), as these bonds have higher liquidity and 
lower credit risk when compared to other European countries (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 
2005). In addition, the 2-year German government bond was also used (𝑟TQ[z{|) in the 
regressions, following the studies of CGM and EJO. Since the two rates have strong correlation, 
the 2-year yield was used in the main regression (whereas the 10-year rate was only used in the 
regression with the theoretical determinants), along with the square of the 2-year rate 
(𝑟TQ[z{|)T to account for convexity issues and capture potential nonlinear effects (Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, 2001). 
3.3.3	-	Historical	Volatility	
Historical volatility is the final determinant that affects firms’ credit spread according to 
Merton. Since firms’ volatility is not possible to observe directly, there are several proxies for 
it, being the historical volatility – based on past stock performance - the most common of those. 
In theory, all else constant, a higher volatility increases the probability of default. The reason 
for this is that if the volatility of the underlying is higher, there is a higher probability of put 
option on the firm to be exercised, since the number of scenarios where the firm enters in default 
increases, leading to an increase to the cost of the insurance – higher CDS spread. This 
relationship is again confirmed by different studies, such as CGM and EJO. 
In order to retrieve the data for firms’ historical volatility, this paper does not use the same 
approach as many others, which obtain time-series data of historical volatility from running 
windows of the previous 250 days’ equity prices. Instead, the historical volatility (ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙) 
used in this paper was retrieved from Bloomberg, where it is possible to get directly the firms’ 






The relationship between equity return and CDS spreads is rather straightforward. Higher stock 
returns imply that the firm is worth more, and the better the company is, the less likely it is 
default to happen. As such, a negative relationship between equity returns and CDS spreads is 
expected. With regards to its relevance, and although some equity market information is already 
incorporated into firms’ leverage ratio, including this variable in the analysis allows for a clearer 
view on the influence of equity returns in CDS spreads. Besides, the correlation of equity 
returns with leverage is not too high, which indicates that the two contribute with different 
levels of information, as in accordance with CGM. 
Equity returns (𝑒𝑞𝑟𝑒𝑡) have been computed by taking series of monthly log returns of each 
firm. Using log-returns also allow for a better analysis since these are more normally distributed 
and symmetrical. (Black & Cox, 1976) (Black & Scholes, The pricing of options and corporate 
liabilities, 1973) (Black & Scholes, The pricing of options and corporate liabilities, 1973; 
Merton, 1974; Longstaff & Schwartz, 1995; Byström, 2006; Jones, Mason, & Rosenfeld, 1984; 
Baltagi, 2001; Coro, Dufour, & Varotto, 2013; Ronn & Verma, 1986) 
3.4.2	-	Implied	Volatility	
This variable, which is based on traders’ expectations and can therefore be considered a good 
proxy for future volatility, comes as another measure of volatility. As implied option volatility 
tends to overshadow historical volatility (Cao, Yu, & Zhong, 2010), including this in the 
regressions may be advantageous. Besides, since the correlation between implied and historical 
volatility is not very high, it indicates that the two represent different measures. It is expected 
a positive relationship between implied volatility and CDS spreads. 
This variable (𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑣𝑜𝑙) has also been collected from Bloomberg, through continuous time-






The slope of the yield curve is a measure of expectations about the future economic conditions 
in the market. Intuitively, the higher the slope the higher the future rates (Carol & Kaeck, 2007), 
since there is an anticipation of future economic growth, and therefore the relationship between 
this variable and CDS spreads should be negative. Nonetheless, this relationship is not entirely 
consensual in the literature, with some authors inferring a positive relationship backed the 
adjusted present value theory (Galil, Shapir, Amiram, & Ben-Zion, 2014).  
In line with both CGM and EJO, the yield slope (𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) is assumed to be the difference between 
the 10-year and the 2-year German government yield.  
3.5.2	-	Market	Return	
In order to capture the overall state of the European economy, monthly log-returns of the 
STOXX Europe 600 Index have also been used (𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑡). Not only this variable helps to assess 
the importance of the business climate on CDS spreads, but it also serves as a proxy for 
systematic risk. As it has been previously mentioned, the motivation for using log-returns is 
that these are more normally distributed and symmetrical. It is expected this variable to have a 
negative relationship with CDS spreads, as higher market returns should indicate expectations 
of better future economic conditions. 
3.5.3	-	Market	Volatility	
As another measure to capture the business climate, market volatility (𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙) has been 
considered in this study. Higher market volatility means there is more uncertainty about the 
future economic prospects of the market, and hence higher CDS spreads are expected when this 
volatility is higher. This variable’s significance has already been tested in the literature, namely 
in the study of Coro et al. (2013), in which there is a positive link with CDS spreads. 






This variable represents a proxy for liquidity risk in the CDS market, and therefore makes sense 
to test its significance in the regressions. This variable should have a positive relationship with 
CDS spreads, as higher bid-ask spreads mean that investors demand more premium for liquidity 
risk, and hence higher bid-ask spreads should indicate higher CDS spreads. The motivation for 
using this specific proxy for liquidity risk is that, according to Fleming (2003), the bid-ask 
spread performs better than other proxies when measuring the liquidity in the US treasure 
market, and despite this study focuses on the European market exclusively, there is sufficient 
basis to believe that Fleming’s conclusion can be applied to this case, and hence it (𝑙𝑖𝑞) should 
be a good proxy for capturing liquidity risk. This variable has been computed by taking the 
absolute difference between the ask and bid quotes of each CDS contract in every month. 
3.6.2	-	Lagged	CDS	spread	
Finally, in order to test if past spreads influence future CDS spreads, the 1st lag of CDS spreads 
(𝑙𝑐𝑑𝑠) has been included in the regressions. According to the study of Byström (2006), the 
iTraxx index (index for CDS of European companies) showed strong and positive 
autocorrelation, which implicates a strong influence of present spreads in future ones. Given 




Before proceeding to the regressions and analysis of the results, it is important to understand 




The data used in this paper is panel data, since it contains a time-series as well as a cross-
sectional dimension7. 
To be possible to perform an accurate analysis of this data, the dependent variable (in this case 
the CDS prices) needs to be stationary. As such, it is necessary to perform unit root tests to the 
CDS data to evaluate it. As Appendix 2 shows, the CDS data in levels is not stationary – in the 
Fisher test we strongly reject that all panels contain unit root, but at the same time we strongly 
reject them to be stationary through Hadri’s test – whereas the first difference of the CDS data 
(CDS in changes) is already stationary – in this situation, Fisher’s indicates us that we should 
reject the null hypothesis that all panels have a unit root, and in Hadri’s test we do not reject 
the hypothesis that all panels are stationary (see Appendix 3). In addition, these results are in 
concordance with the graphs for both the CDS levels and changes (see appendixes 4 and 5 
respectively) – while the graph for the levels shows that the mean and variance of the data 
changes throughout the period, in the graph for CDS changes one can see that these parameters 
have the same behaviour during the whole period.  
Given the previous results, the regressions will use the variables (dependent and independents) 
in changes, which means that the data corresponds to monthly changes instead of the actual 
values. This analysis is in line with the study of CGM where the first differences of the variables 
are also used, and it should also provide better conclusions, since analysing how CDS spreads 
change when other variables change constitutes a more rigorous test to the theory (Ericsson, 
Jacobs, & Oviedo, 2004). 
4.2	-	Regressions	
Firstly, as well as EJO did in their study, a regression on the theoretical determinants (1) is 
made, followed by three individual regressions on each one of the theoretical determinants (2-
																																																						





4) to examine their influence on CDS’s. Then, two other regressions are made, this time to 
analyse the explicative power of the firm-based (5) and market-based (6) variables, 
respectively. Afterwards, the complete regression (7) that contains all variables is presented. 
There is also a multi-period analysis that refers to regression (7) evaluated over four sub-periods 
(pre-crisis, during crisis, during crisis extended, Eurozone crisis, after Eurozone crisis)8. The 
objective of the regressions (1-7) is to test how well these explain CDS changes, whereas the 
multi-period analysis seeks to investigate if all the determinants have always had the same 
importance for CDS changes, or if some have stopped or started to be considered after two 
events that have changed the world financial paradigm of this century – the 07/08 crisis, and 
the Eurozone crisis. In addition to the 7 main regressions, others were made to improve the 
analysis of the impact of certain determinants. 
Regression on theoretical determinants: 
 
 
Δ𝑐𝑑𝑠R# = 𝛼R + 𝛽OΔ𝑙𝑒𝑣R# + 𝛽TΔ𝑟#
ONQ[z{| + 𝛽Δℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙R# + 𝜀R# (1) 
Regression on changes in leverage: 
 
 
Δ𝑐𝑑𝑠R# = 𝛼R + 𝛽OΔ𝑙𝑒𝑣R# + 𝜀R# (2) 
Regression on changes in the risk-free rate: 
 
 
Δ𝑐𝑑𝑠R# = 𝛼R + 𝛽OΔ𝑟#
ONQ[z{| + 𝜀R# (3) 
Regression on changes in historical volatility: 
 
 
Δ𝑐𝑑𝑠R# = 𝛼R + 𝛽OΔℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙R# + 𝜀R# (4) 
Regression on firm-based variables: 
 Δ𝑐𝑑𝑠R# = 𝛼R + 𝛽OΔ𝑒𝑞𝑟𝑒𝑡R# + 𝛽TΔ𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑣𝑜𝑙R# + 𝜀R# (5) 
																																																						
8 The multi-periods sample is the following: 01/2006 to 06/2007 (pre-crisis); 07/2007 to 03/2009 (during crisis); 






Regression on market-based variables: 
 
 
Δ𝑐𝑑𝑠R# = 𝛼R + 𝛽OΔ𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒R# + 𝛽TΔ𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑡R# + 𝛽Δ𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙R# + 𝜀R# (6) 




Δ𝑐𝑑𝑠R# = 𝛼R + 𝛽OΔ𝑙𝑒𝑣R# + 𝛽TΔ𝑟#
TQ[z{| + 𝛽Δℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙R# + 𝛽Δ𝑒𝑞𝑟𝑒𝑡R# + 𝛽Δ𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑣𝑜𝑙R# + 𝛽Δ𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒R#
+ 𝛽Δ𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑡R# + 𝛽Δ𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙R# + 𝛽Δ𝑙𝑖𝑞R# + 𝛽ONΔ𝑙𝑐𝑑𝑠R# + 𝛽OO(Δ𝑟#
TQ[z{|)T + 𝜀R# 
(7) 
Since there is strong correlation between the 10-year and the 2-year yields (see Appendix 6), 
this paper mimics the study of EJO and therefore in equation (7), which is equivalent to the 
robust regression in the aforesaid study, the 10-year yield has been substituted by the 2-year 
German government yield. Here, the squared of the 2-year yield was also added, for reasons 
that have been previously explained. 
Before analysing the regressions’ results, it is useful to understand how these regressions work 
and the econometrics behind them. There are two different techniques to analyse panel data: 
fixed effects and random effects. According to Gujarati (2003), fixed effects models should be 
used when: the number of time-series data is large and the cross-sectional units are rather small; 
some firm-specific components that are correlated with the independent variables are omitted; 
the cross-sectional units are randomly drawn from a bigger sample. Indeed, according to these 
criteria, a fixed effects model might have seemed more appropriate for this study. Nevertheless, 
when performing a Hausman test on the data to decide which type of model to use, the random 
effects model becomes more appropriate (see Appendix 8). 
After having decided the type of model that should be used, a series of tests are also required 
to control the data for heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional dependence of residuals, and serial 





After performing all the necessary tests, all the regressions were performed using Driscoll and 
Kraay standards errors, which allows them to be consistent with heteroskedasticity and robust 
to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence9. 
5	-	Results	
5.1	-	Analysis	of	the	Descriptive	Statistics	
This section will only comprise the data evaluation on changes, since this data has been proven 
to be stationary, contrasting with the data on levels. To get a good understanding about the 
evolution of all variables, descriptive statistics of not only the CDS changes but also of the 
changes in the explanatory variables can be found (see Appendix 7). There are also descriptive 
statistics that refer to different sub samples of the whole period, to allow for a more in depth 
analysis of the changes in the different variables (see Appendix 11)10. 
CDS spreads have increased on average 0.33 basis points during the sample period with a large 
standard deviation (30.83). It is interesting to see that, despite this overall increase in CDS 
spreads, during the period before 06/2007 CDS spreads have decreased on average 0.659 basis 
points, as the markets were confidents on companies’ solvency and financial strength, which 
turn out to be a wrong assumption as we know. This situation was normalized after the crisis, 
as the average CDS change was of 1.121 basis points from 01/2006 and 03/2010, caused by the 
increase in these derivatives prices after the crisis hit the markets. 
Regarding firms’ leverage ratio, the average change during the whole period was of 0.023 basis 
points, although between 01/2006 and 03/2010, and mainly because of the 07/08 financial 
crisis, this value increased on average 0.148 basis points. Even more noticeable, is the fact that 
after 03/2010, firms on average decreased in 0.053 basis points their leverage ratios, even 
																																																						
9 More information about how this method, please refer to “Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with 
Cross-Sectional Dependence” by Daniel Hoechle, University of Basel  
10 If, in the following analysis, the whole period is mentioned, please refer to Appendix 7, if other specific period 




though this was a period characterized by low and even negative risk-free rates (10-year and 2-
year rates also declined in the homologous period). This period coincided with the Eurozone 
crisis, in which many European firms’ profits plummeted (equity returns decreased on average 
as well during that phase) and therefore many had to deleverage their capital structures and cut 
costs in order to keep their businesses going. 
Throughout the sample period it it also of interest to point out the small yet positive changes in 
both equity and market returns, although these variables have decreased in the periods before 
and after the 07/08 crisis. The reasoning for the negative changes prior to the crisis can be 
supported by the fact that the American firms and markets were trading at all time highs before 
the crisis, whilst the decrease after the crisis can be explained by the Eurozone crisis. The 
volatility of returns and markets has also increased during the whole period, with special focus 
on the period that refers to the 07/08 crisis, given the deterioration of the economy, and 
subsequent increase of the uncertainty around future growth prospects.  
Regarding the liquidity in the European CDS market, during the whole period it has increased, 
despite its decline before the 07/08 crisis. 
5.2	-	Results	from	Regressions	
5.2.1	-	Regression	with	Theoretical	Variables	(Regressions	1-4)	
The results on the changes of the theoretical variables can be seen in the Appendix 12. As the 
results show, all three variables under this regression have found to be statistically significant 
when explaining the changes of CDS. Nonetheless, the explanatory power of regression 1 is 
rather low (14.88%) which suggests that the changes of theoretical determinants predicted by 
Merton’s model are not sufficient when explaining changes in CDS. Regarding the signs of 
each of the variables’ coefficients in regression 1, all three signs are in line to what the theory 
predicts to be the relation of each variable with CDS spreads – positive for leverage and 




1 and 3 corresponds to the 10-year yield, whereas in the complete regression the yield used is 
the 2-year rate. This assumption was taken for the regressions to be in line with EJO’s study. 
The regressions 2, 3 and 4, which correspond to the regressions on the individual theoretical 
determinants also show that each explanatory variable is statistically significant when 
explaining CDS changes. When analyzing each of these regressions, it is possible to see that 
leverage has an explanatory power of 8.64%, the risk-free rate of 4.91%, and changes in 
historical volatility are only able to explain only able to explain 5.86% of the changes in CDS. 
The results indicate that these variables explain very little of the CDS variation, and hence 
should be placed together with other explanatory variables. In fact, in the case of historical 
volatility it is possible to infer that, when compared to implied volatility (see Appendix 13), 
implied volatility outperforms historical, as Cao et al. (2010) conclude - higher R-squared for 
implied volatility (7.03%). 
5.2.2	-	Regression	with	Firm	based	Variables	(Regression	5)	
The results for this regression can be seen in Appendix 14. When regressing CDS changes on 
changes of the selected firm-based variables – equity returns and implied volatility –  the 
explanatory power remains at very low levels (7.36%), which means one of two things: either 
the number of firm-based variables is not sufficient (which is reasonable to assume), or that it 
is sufficient but there are other factors that also influence CDS changes (the last part is also 
realistic). When looking at the coefficients of the variables, both follow the relationship 
predicted by the theory -  equity returns negatively influence CDS and implied volatility 
impacts positively. Nonetheless, the most striking conclusion that can be taken from this 
regression is that equity returns have found to be not statistically significant for the CDS 
changes. This suggests that the European firms-specific returns do not affect CDS changes 
significantly, which can mean that other factors related to, for instance, market sentiment or 




multicollinearity between the two explanatory variables of regression 5, which can cause the 
insignificance of the equity returns. 
5.2.3	-	Regression	with	Market	based	Variables	(Regression	6)	
The results for this regression can be see in Appendix 17. When looking at the explanatory 
power of this regression (9.74%), one could assume that regressing CDS changes on changes 
in market-level variables is a better exercise than regressing on the changes of firm-level 
variables, even though at a still quite low degree. In fact, and given the results of regression 5, 
where equity returns were proved to be not significant, the previous idea might seem even more 
realistic. Nonetheless, from the 3 market level variables of regression 6 - slope of the yield 
curve, market return, and market volatility – only the last variable was found to be statistically 
significant, meaning that purely based on market-level variables, only the changes in the market 
volatility index are significant in explaining changes in CDS. Here, the same problem of 
multicollinearity may arise, as it is possible that the different market level variables provide 
redundant information. Regarding the variables’ coefficients, changes on both market volatility 
and the slope of the yield have the same relationship with CDS changes as predicted by theory, 
whereas market returns have a positive coefficient, contrarily to what rationally makes sense - 
higher market returns should decrease CDS spreads, ceteris paribus. Nonetheless, when 
regressing CDS changes individually on changes in market returns (see Appendix 18), the 
coefficient signal is actually negative, and in line with theory. 
Given the where neither equity returns nor market returns are able to explain changes in CDS, 
a problem arises, since it would be expected that at least one of these two variables would be 
significant. As such, in appendix 18, three new regressions are displayed – regression on 
changes in equity returns, regression on changes in market returns, and regression on both 
changes – with a more elucidative conclusion for the former problem. On both individual 




significant at 1%, while market returns are always significant. Besides, market returns have a 
higher explanatory power (3.93%) than equity returns (1.98%), despite their low levels. 
Moreover, in the regression with both variables, only market returns were found to be 
statistically significant, which may indicate that in general market-level variables are indeed 
better determinants of CDS changes than firm-specific variables. 
5.2.4	-	Regression	7:	Complete	Regression	
The results for this regression can be see in Appendix 19. Regression 7 puts all the variables 
identified previously, according to the literature, as possible determinants of CDS changes 
together. The explanatory variables of this regression are: changes in leverage ratio, changes in 
the risk-free rate, changes in historical volatility, changes in equity returns, changes in the slope 
of the yield curve, changes in market returns, changes in market volatility, changes in the bid-
ask spread, changes in the lagged credit spread, and changes in the squared risk-free rate. 
Following the study of EJO, this regression evaluates the 2-year yield and its square instead of 
the 10-year rate. 
The results show that, when the number of explanatory variables increase, so did the 
explanatory power of the regression, in this case changes in these variables are able to explain 
34.33% of changes in CDS, which suggests that there are still other variables that influence 
CDS changes. Nonetheless, when compared with Merton’s model determinants, where the R-
squared was of 14.88%, this regression more than doubled its explanatory power. In addition, 
results show that historical volatility, equity return, market return, market volatility and the lag 
of CDS changes are not statistically significant, which indicates that these might not be 
considered for CDS changes and the pricing of these derivatives. In fact, when running a new 
regression without these variables, the explanatory power is almost the same (33.37%) and all 
the variables the regression contains are significant (see Appendix 20). This suggests that firm-




when looking at the business climate, the expectations of future interest rates (from the slope 
of the yield curve) are more important for CDS changes than the state of market itself, 
characterized by its returns. 
Regarding the signs of the coefficients, only equity returns and the lagged CDS change 
contradict the theory, as equity returns have a positive coefficient and the lag has a negative 
one, contrarily to the findings of Byström study, where positive autocorrelation was found. The 
reason for the contrary sign of the lagged changes may be that the datasets from Byström’s 
study was only specific to his study. Nonetheless, the fact this variable is not statistically 
significant suggests that CDS changes do not integrate much information about future changes. 
About the changes in the bid-ask spread (the only variable that has not been discussed in the 
regressions so far), these have found to be statistically significant and with a positive 
coefficient, corroborating the positive the relationship with CDS changes according to theory. 	
5.2.5	-	Multi-period	analysis	
The main purpose of this analysis is to find out if, throughout the whole sample period, some 
of the variables changed their significance in explaining the changes in CDS. The whole sample 
has been divided in 5 different sub-samples, which represent different moments during the 
decade under analysis: 01/2006 to 06/2007 (pre-crisis); 07/2007 to 03/2009 (during crisis); 
07/2009 to 03/2010 (during crisis extended); 04/2010 to 12/2013 (Eurozone crisis); 01/2014 to 
12/2016 (after Eurozone crisis). Besides the results from each sub-sample regression (see 
Appendix 21), there is a table that shows the significance of each variable in each of the periods 
(see Appendix 22). 
From Appendix 22 it is possible to take some fairly interesting conclusions. From all the 11 
determinants, there are 3 in which the statistical significance has changed throughout the whole 
period. These are the changes in leverage, the changes in equity returns, and the changes in the 




significant when analysing the whole sample period, in the period before the first crisis (from 
01/2006 to 06/2007), these were not considered relevant when assessing the changes in CDS. 
The reason for this result may be that, prior to the crisis, other factors had more importance 
when explaining the changes in CDS, as the entities that were responsible for pricing CDS 
tended to overlook the degree of leverage of the underlying companies. In fact, this and other 
facts have led to the burst of the markets, as the prices of the securities didn’t reflect the real 
degree of risk.  
The same reasoning applies to equity returns, that prior to the same crisis were statistically 
significant, and after these stop being. From the point of view of an investor it makes sense that, 
after an event such as the 07/08 crisis, the prices of an insurance against a default of one of his 
investments should not be majorly supported by the returns of the underlying, as the issues of 
solvency and default risk are not really being considered in equity returns unless there is some 
public information about it, which many times there is not. 
In the case of the changes in the slope of the yield, it is interesting the fact that the two periods 
when this variable was found to be not statistically significant coincide with the periods when 
the slope is less than 1%. In terms of the theoretical consequences, a low slope of the yield 
curve means that the expectations of the future economic conditions are not too bright, but this 
should not be a justification for the statistical insignificance of the variables, as poor prospects 
of the future economic conditions should be reflected on CDS changes and prices, that should 
increase. On the other hand, from an econometric point of view, the periods of non significance 
were periods in which the slope of the yield curve did not vary as much at stay at values really 
close to zero. As CDS changes continue to move, since the changes in the yield slope variable 
remained rather static it is possible that the effects on CDS changes were diminished to the 





The main objective of this master thesis was to study what factors have influenced the changes 
in CDS spreads of European non-financial companies since 2006 until the the end of 2016. 
Departing from an analysis of how well the theoretical determinants derived by Merton did 
explain CDS variations, additional variables were subsequently considered along with a multi-
period analysis of the whole sample set.   
Overall, the results from the regressions are in line with the findings of the two studies that have 
been the main references for this thesis (EJO and CGM). Regarding the regression on the 
theoretical determinants, all three have found to be statistical significant when explaining the 
changes on CDS spreads, and all three presented the same signs as the predicted by theory. 
Moreover, and in line with other authors, implied volatility was found to be a better indicator 
for measuring firms’ volatility than the historical volatility.    Nevertheless, the changes on the 
theoretical determinants were only able to explain 14.88% of the changes in the CDS spreads 
during the whole period. 
After regressing the CDS changes on theoretical determinants only, both firm-based and 
market-based variables have been added and some noticeable results have been found. First, it 
is important to highlight that the explanatory power of the regression with all variables was of 
34.33%, more than the double of the regression on theoretical determinants. In addition, when 
comparing the regression of each one of the three groups of variables (theoretical, firm and 
market based), the results have shown that theoretical determinants have the highest 
explanatory power and firm-based variables the lowest. Contrarily to what was expected, 
though, has been the absence of statistical significance in the variables of changes in historical 
volatility, changes in equity return, changes in market return, changes in market volatility and 




in equity returns the lagged CDS changes contradict the theory predicted signs, which has also 
been a surprise.  
Regarding the multi-period analysis, there have been three variables whose statistical 
significance has changed. Changes in leverage have not been statistical significance in the pre-
crisis period while equity returns have only been statistical significant in the same pre-crisis 
period. The other variable was the changes on the slope of the yield curve, which have not been 
statistical significant in the pre-crisis period and in the period after the Eurozone crisis, 
remaining significant in the remaining periods. Another impressive result has been the 
explanatory power of the regression in the period after the Eurozone crisis, which was 42.98%, 
the highest among all regressions.  
In conclusion, as theoretical determinants determinants have found to have reduced explanatory 
power when explaining the changes in CDS spreads, other variables variables have been 
considered. Nevertheless, the results obtained suggest there are still other factors which have 
not been considered that influence the changes in firms’ CDS. 
Given the nature of this project and the extent of the different sections of this thesis, I believe 
that the limitations encountered along the way should also be mentioned. First of all, regarding 
the data, as I wanted to considered only firms where all the information which did not enter in 
default during the period, some companies were not considered in the study, which may have 
impacted the results of the regressions. In addition, regarding the variables chosen, and 
specially regarding the firm-level variables which were only two, I believe that more should 
have been added, in order to try to better explain the changes in CDS spreads. As an example, 
the financial statement ratios used in Moody’s KMV RISKCALC Model (one of the most 
important models used in the subject nowadays) could have been considered, since these 
comprise different risk factors in profitability, leverage, debt coverage, growth, liquidity 




and recovery rates could have also been considered, as these make sense to influence CDS 
changes. All in all, a more extensive group of variables could have been considered for the 
regressions, which could have resulted in higher explanatory powers. Nevertheless, this thesis 
has allowed me to better understand of credit default swaps work and what are the main factor 
that influence the changes in these derivatives prices. Regarding the first part of the thesis 
concerning CDS, their benefits, costs and market, it could have been interesting to include some 
practical cases and results from empirical studies concerning the benefits and drawbacks, as 
well as a section dedicated to regulation on the subject, with the objective to analyse what has 
been done in the world of CDS so far, and what are the prospects for the future.  
All these considerations have been made according to the ultimate goal of my master thesis, 
which was to provide an insightful output to any person who wants to get a deep understanding 
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Appendix 1: List of companies used in the study 
Ticker Name 
AAL LN Equity Anglo American PLC 
ABE SQ Equity Abertis Infraestructuras SA 
AD NA Equity Koninklijke Ahold Delhaize NV 
AIR FP Equity Airbus SE 
AKZA NA Equity Akzo Nobel NV 
BA/ LN Equity BAE Systems PLC 
BAS GY Equity BASF SE 
BATS LN Equity British American Tobacco PLC 
BAYN GY Equity Bayer AG 
BMW GY Equity Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 
BN FP Equity Danone SA 
BP/ LN Equity BP PLC 
BT/A LN Equity BT Group PLC 
CA FP Equity Carrefour SA 
CO FP Equity Casino Guichard Perrachon SA 
CON GY Equity Continental AG 
CPG LN Equity Compass Group PLC 
DAI GY Equity Daimler AG 
DG FP Equity Vinci SA 
DGE LN Equity Diageo PLC 
DSM NA Equity Koninklijke DSM NV 
DTE GY Equity Deutsche Telekom AG 
ELE SQ Equity Endesa SA 
ELUXB SS Equity Electrolux AB 
ENEL IM Equity Enel SpA 
ENI IM Equity Eni SpA 
EOAN GY Equity E.ON SE 
ERICB SS Equity Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson 
FORTUM FH Equity Fortum OYJ 
FP FP Equity TOTAL SA 
GAS SQ Equity Gas Natural SDG SA 
IBE SQ Equity Iberdrola SA 
IMB LN Equity Imperial Brands PLC 
KER FP Equity Kering 
KGF LN Equity Kingfisher PLC 
KPN NA Equity Koninklijke KPN NV 
LCL LN Equity Ladbrokes Coral Group PLC 
LHA GY Equity Deutsche Lufthansa AG 
LIN GY Equity Linde AG 
MC FP Equity LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE 




MRW LN Equity Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC 
NESN VX Equity Nestle SA 
NG/ LN Equity National Grid PLC 
ORA FP Equity Orange SA 
PHIA NA Equity Koninklijke Philips NV 
PSON LN Equity Pearson PLC 
REL LN Equity RELX PLC 
REP SQ Equity Repsol SA 
RI FP Equity Pernod Ricard SA 
RNO FP Equity Renault SA 
RWE GY Equity RWE AG 
SAN FP Equity Sanofi 
SBRY LN Equity J Sainsbury PLC 
SGO FP Equity Cie de Saint-Gobain 
STERV FH Equity Stora Enso OYJ 
STL NO Equity Statoil ASA 
STM IM Equity STMicroelectronics NV 
TEL NO Equity Telenor ASA 
TELIA SS Equity Telia Co AB 
TIT IM Equity Telecom Italia SpA/Milano 
TKA GY Equity thyssenkrupp AG 
TSCO LN Equity Tesco PLC 
UG FP Equity Peugeot SA 
UNA NA Equity Unilever NV 
UPM FH Equity UPM-Kymmene OYJ 
VIE FP Equity Veolia Environnement SA 
VIV FP Equity Vivendi SA 
VOD LN Equity Vodafone Group PLC 
VOLVB SS Equity Volvo AB 
WKL NA Equity Wolters Kluwer NV 
































Appendix 4: 5y CDS levels 
 
 





Appendix 6: Correlation matrix of variables (in changes) 
 
 










Appendix 8: Hausman test 












Appendix 9: Testing the presence of heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional dependence, and serial 
correlation 
<< TESTING FOR CROSS-SECTIONAL DEPENDENCE (PASARAN CD TEST) >> 
 
xtreg cds_d1 leverage_d1 rftwo_d1 histvol_d1 eqret_d1 impvol_d1 
slope_d1 mreturn_d1 mvol_d1 liq_d1 lcds_d1 sqfree_d1, re 
xtcsd, pesaran abs 
 
Note: if we reject null, then use Driscoll and Kraay standard 
errors using the command xtscc 
 
 
<< TESTING FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY >> 
 
xtreg cds_d1 leverage_d1 rftwo_d1 histvol_d1 eqret_d1 impvol_d1 
slope_d1 mreturn_d1 mvol_d1 liq_d1 lcds_d1 sqfree_d1, fe 
xttest3 
 
Note: if we reject null, then there is heteroskedasticity 
 
 
<< TESTING FOR SERIAL CORRELATION (FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION) 
>> 
 
xtserial cds_d1 leverage_d1 rftwo_d1 histvol_d1 eqret_d1 
impvol_d1 slope_d1 mreturn_d1 mvol_d1 liq_d1 lcds_d1 sqfree_d1 
 













































Appendix 14: Regression on firm based variables (Regression 5) 
 
Appendix 17: Regression on market based variables (Regression 6) 
 
Appendix 18: Regressions on equity returns and market returns 





Regression on market returns 
 























































































After Eurozone crisis 
 














leverage_d1	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	rftwo_d1	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
histvol_d1	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	
eqret_d1	 No	 Yes	 No	 No	 No	 No	
	impvol_d1	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
slope_d1	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
	mreturn_d1	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	
	mvol_d1	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	
liq_d1	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
lcds_d1	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	
sqfree_d1	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	
R-squared	 34,33%	 12,07%	 34,33%	 34,33%	 34,33%	 42,98%	
	
